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Medicare and Medicaid, initiated in 1966 under the Johnson
Administration, were in the forefront of the Great Society pro-
grams designed to help the poor and disadvantaged enjoy the fruits
of a growing and prosperous economy. They received the largest
and most rapidly growing share of budgetary resources of all social
programs enacted during that period. In fiscal 1975, governmental
expenditures under the federal-state Medicaid program are ex-
pected to be $13 billion, providing medical care services for 25
million low-income people; Medicare is expected to spend $15
billion on medical care services for 24 million elderly and disabled
people.
Concern with the high cost of these programs has almost eclipsed
the substantial achievements of the programs in increasing access
to medical care services by many persons who formerly had to seek
charity care or do without much-needed care. To gain better
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391perspective on the benefits of these programs, this paper will TABLE1Phy
addressthree major questions:
COlT
1.What impact have Medicare and Medicaid had on use of
Ageand IncomeGr medicalservices by the poor and elderly, particularly in
relationto other persons with similar health problems? All ages
2.What factors account for uneven utilization of medical ser- Low income
vices by persons eligible for Medicaid? Middle income
3.To what extent do socioeconomic and demographic character- High income






1. IMPACTOF MEDICARE AND MEDICAID ON Ratio,high incon USEOF MEDICAL SERVICES
Recentevidence indicates that Medicare and Medicaid have led to 15-64years
marked improvements in contact with the medical system by poor Low income
Middle income persons and greatly increased the access of the elderly of all income High income classes to institutional services such as hospital and nursing home
care. Andersen et al. (1972) report that in 1970, 65 of Ratio, high incor
low-income persons saw a physician during the year, compared
with 56 per cent in 1963.' They also point out that poor pregnant 65 years and older
Low income women began increasingly to visit physicians earlier—71 percent of Middle income low-income women received medical attention in the first trimester High income
of pregnancy in 1970 as against 58 per cent in 1963. Results from
National Health Surveys show that, while 11 out of every 100 Ratio, high incoz
elderly persons were hospitalized in 1962, 16 were hospitalized in RCES:U.S. Dep
1968.2 Statistics,
Furthermore, these changes in use of services were not part of an
States, Jul
1971.
overall pattern. Utilization by higher-income persons remained 'low income is
defined as $4,000-$6,l stable over the period or declined slightly. Therefore, the poor above in 1964and$10
made striking gains in use of services relative to higher-income
groups. As shown in Table 1, in fiscal 1964 high-income persons
paid 19 per cent more visits to a physician than low-income
persons; by 1971, more low-income persons than high-income this period.
persons were using such services. began to
There also were significant redistributions in institutional care. adjustment
Pettingill (1972) reports that although days of hospital care for the the under
aged increased at an annual rate of between 6 and 13 per cent in the Loewenstei
first three years following the inception of Medicare, days of care in the use o
by persons under age 65 declined steadily.3 The share of hospital cutbacks in
days spent by the elderly increased by six percentage points over
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TABLE 1Physician Visits per Capita, by Age and Family-In-
come Group, Fiscal Year 1964, Calendar Year 1971
Age and incomeGroupa 1964 1971
All ages 4.5 5.0
Low income . 4.3 5.6
Middle income 4.5 4.7
High income 5.1 4.9
Ratio, high income to low income 1.19 , .88
Under 15 years
Low income 2.7 4.0
Middle income . 2.8 4.1
High income 4.5 4.8
Ratio, high income to low income 1.67 1.20
15—64 years
Low income 4.4 5.8
Middle income 4.7 4.9
High income 4.9 4.8
Ratio, high income to low income 1.11 .83
65 years and older
Low income 6.3 6.7
Middle income 7.0 6.4
High income 7.3 7.5
Ratio, high income to low income 1.16 1.12
SOURCES:U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, National Center for Health
Statistics, Volume of Physician Visits by Place of Visit and Type of Service, United
States, July 1963—June1964, Series10, No. 18, (1965) and unpublished tabulations for
1971.
a Lowincome is defined as under $4,000 in 1964andunder $5,000 in 1971. Middle income is
defined as $4,000—$6,999 in 1964 and $5,000.-$10,000 in 1971. High income is defined as $7,000 and
above in 1964 and $10,000 and above in 1971.
this period. In later years, hospital care of younger age groups
began to increase relatively faster, as might be expected as the
adjustment to Medicare ended and private insurance coverage of
the under age 65 group continued to expand.4 In addition,
Loewenstein has found that Medicare induced a marked increase
in the use of extended care facilities by the elderly.5 Administrative
cutbacks in this benefit in 1969 later moderated these gains.
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r
care.
pital care for the
13 per cent in the
days of care
share of hospital
ftage points overAlthough these data and studies give solid support to the conten- WelfareStatL
tionthat Medicare and Medicaid have been largely successful in Although ii
achieving their goal of ensuring access to medical care services for medical se
covered persons, they are subject to several qualifications, persons ha
First, Medicaid does not provide medical care services for all those exclu
poor persons, but only those falling within certain welfare well behin
categories, such as single-parent families, and the blind, disabled, Data froi
and aged. In 1974, an estimated 9 million persons with incomes tional Cen
below the poverty level, or about 35 per cent of the poor, were medical car
ineligible for Medicaid. Therefore, gains in use of medical services poor perso
may not be widely shared by all poor persons. coverage u
Second, greater equality in utilization of medical services among mind. At I-
income classes may be misleading because poor persons generally Medicaid r
havemore severe health problems than higher-income persons, effect at th
and persons receiving welfare are less healthy as a whole than other eligible for
poor persons. Comparisons among persons of similar health status at that timi
can therefore be expected to indicate much wider differences in use persons un
of services among income classes. that some
Third, even if utilization of services is adjusted for health needs welfare ma
of the population, the poor may still not participate in examining
"mainstream" medicine, receiving care of comparable quality, evidence o
convenience, and style to that received by more fortunate persons. Medicaid r
Poor persons may continue to be treated in crowded and dreary As
clinics, enduring long waits and receiving few amenities. Care may persons w
be discontinuous, episodic, fragmented, and impersonal if patients assistance
see different physicians or health personnel at each visit. Any given those poor
level of care, as measured by physician visits or days of care in a on welfar
hospital, may be less effective in terms of meeting the patient's above $15,
health needs than the same level of care received by higher-income lems of ti
patients in more amenable settings. services m
Finally, even if Medicare and Medicaid have assisted poor and misleadinl
elderly persons as a whole in receiving care comparable to that Medicaid
received by others, racial discrimination or variations in the availa-
bility of medical resources may lead to a very uneven distribution
of benefits among eligible persons. HealthStat
Tosort out the simultaneous influence of health status, income, Income
coverageunder public programs, sociodemographic factors, and
M availability of medical resources requires sophisticated techniques ore imP(
of analysis. Before turning to such an analysis, however, it services a
instructive to review briefly evidence on utilization rates and types determine
with high of care received by persons of various income classes, once some
d't adjustment is made for welfare eligibility and health status. not a JUS
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Welfare Status and Use of Medical Services
Althoughthe poor as a whole have made marked gains in the use of
medical services relative to higher-income groups, not all poor
persons have received benefits from the Medicaid program. For
those excluded from coverage, utilization of physician services lags
well behind other poor persons and higher-income persons.
Data from the 1969 Health Interview Survey (HIS) of the Na-
tional Center for Health Statistics pennit some comparison of
medical care utilization of poor persons receiving welfare and other
poor persons. This categorization provides a rough indication of
coverage under Medicaid, but several problems should be kept in
mind. At the beginning of 1969, eleven states did not have
Medicaid programs (although all but two states had programs in
effect at the beginning of 1970), so that some persons, although
eligible for public assistance, were not receiving medical assistance
at that time. Furthermore, some states covered medically needy
persons under Medicaid as well as public assistance recipients, so
that some of the utilization of services by poor persons not on
welfare may be influenced by the Medicaid program. Nevertheless,
examining these two groups of poor persons provides some rough
evidence of utilization of medical services by persons eligible for
Medicaid relative to other poor persons.
As shown in Table 2, data from the 1969 HIS indicate that
persons with incomes below $5,000 who were not on public
assistance averaged 4.7 physician visits compared with 6.6 visits for
those poor on welfare. The physician visit rate for poor persons not
on welfare was actually less than that of persons with incomes
above $ 15,000—even before adjusting for the greater health prob-
lems of the poor. Thus, the conclusion that the poor now use
services more than do higher-income persons is at least partially
misleading because it does not distinguish among those eligible for
Medicaid and other poor persons.
HealthStatus and Use of Services by
Income Classes
Moreimportant, however, is the fact that comparing use of medical
services among income classes is misleading in any attempt to
determine whether the poor now have equal access to medical care
with higher-income persons inasmuch as such a comparison does
not adjust for the more serious health problems of the poor.


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































There are many dimensions of ill health and the "medical need"
for care, ranging from discomfort, pain, and debilitating conditions
to potentially fatal medical problems. Holding constant for health
status in an examination of utilization patterns among income
classes is difficult, both because data on these dimensions of health
are limited and because the range and intensity of these conditions
differ markedly so there is little consensus on which measures are
most analytically appropriate.
A crude adjustment, however, can be made using data supplied j inthe 1969 HIS. The survey includes data on several dimensions of
health status, including chronic conditions and limitation of activity
that may be considered indicators of a "health stock" and number of
days during the year in which activity is restricted, which reflects
the incidence of more episodic illness. Obviously, even these
measures of health status can vary markedly since two illnesses of
the same duration may reflect quite different needs for medical
I care.Furthermore, some needs for medical care, such as maternity
j care,may be accompanied by very little restriction of activity. In
spite of the limitations of these measures, however, they do permit
I usto gain some insight into the effect of substantial differences in
need for services among income classes.
— Table2 indicates physician visit rates for persons of different
income classes if they were to experience the average level of
chronic conditions and restricted activity days of persons in their
age group. These results were derived from ordinary least
—I squaresregressions reported in Appendix 2, Table 1.6
Adjustment for health status leads to a striking change in utiliza-
tion patterns. Instead of following a U-shaped pattern with low-
income persons using services more than middle-income persons,
utilization increases uniformly with income. Poor persons eligible
for welfare use physician services about the same as middle-income
persons with comparable health problems, whereas those low-
income persons not on public assistance lag substantially behind
other poor and middle-income persons in use of services. Children
infamilies with above $15,000 visit physicians 53 per cent
more frequently' than poor children not on welfare, whereas high-
elderly persons see physicians more than 72 per cent more
often than poor elderly persons not on welfare.
0
Quality and Convenience of Medical Care
Although the poor, particularly those on welfare, have made
markedgains in use of medical services relative to other income
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groups, there is evidence that the poor do not obtain care in the
same setting, from the same kind of physicians, and with the same
ease and convenience as higher-income persons. Instead, the
poor—whether on welfare or not—are much more likely to receive
care from general practitioners than from specialists, in a hospital
outpatient department rather than in a physician's office, and after
traveling long distances and waiting substantially longer for care.
As shown in Table 3, the poor receive 70 per cent of their care
from general practitioners, compared with 41 per cent for persons
with family incomes over $15,000. Few poor children receive care
from pediatricians. Higher-income women of child-bearing age are
also twice as likely as are poor women to be cared for by specialists.
The proportion of care received from specialists does not vary appre-
ciably among the poor on welfare and other poor.
Some differences among income classes also exist in the place in
which care is obtained. Persons with family incomes above $15,000
receive 87 per cent of their physician care in private settings (office,
home, or telephone call to private physician) compared with only
80 per cent for those with family incomes below $5,000. The poor
on welfare are even less likely to receive care in private settings—
only 75 per cent.
It is hazardous to draw inferences about the quality and adequacy
of care from these differences in the extent of specialist care and
differences in the setting of treatment. It may well be, contrary to
common belief, that specialist care for children and pregnant
women is no more efficacious than care from a general practitioner;










All persons 59 32 21
Under $5,000 70 18 13
Aid 73 21 6
No aid 70 17 14
$5,000-9,999 61 30 23
$10,000—14,999 51 40 24
$15,000 and over 41 39 23
SOURCE: Calculated from the 1969 Health
Statistics.
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d with the same
Instead, the
likely to receive
sts, in a hospital
office, and after
longer for care.





























and care in a hospital outpatient department, incorporating the best
of recent medical research, may be better than care from a private
physician long since departed from medical school.
Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude that the poor do not receive
the same kind of medical care received by most middle-income
citizens. One manifestation of the pursuit of a desirable level of
care and differences in the place in which care is obtained is the
less convenient care received by low-income persons. The poor
spend 50 per cent more time traveling and waiting to see a
physician than do higher-income persons. Combined waiting and
traveling time is also higher for the poor on welfare, a total of 81
minutes per visit compared with 66 minutes for other poor persons
(and 43 minutes for those with family incomes above $15,000). In
addition to the higher prices for medical care, the poor also face
substantial burdens on the nonmonetary resources of their house-
holds in seeking medical care. Furthermore, although welfare
recipients for the most part pay no monetary price under Medicaid
for health services, they have assumed higher nonmonetary costs.
2.DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICAID BENEFITS
Althoughit is clear that the poor have made striking gains relative
to higher-income groups in using medical services, it is also true
that not all the poor have shared equally in these gains. Persons not
receiving public assistance lag substantially behind Medicaid re-
cipients in use of services. But even for those covered by Medicaid,
program data suggest that benefits are very unevenly distributed.
In this section we explore in greater detail the sources of variations
in use of services among public assistance recipients and their
experience relative to other low-income persons.
Medicaid is a federal-state program in which states have consid-
erable leeway to determine eligibility for benefits, range of medical
services covered, and limits on benefits for any given type of
service. About half the states provide coverage for medically needy
persons who, although not sufficiently poor to qualify for public
assistance, are unable to meet the costs of medical bills.7 Although
all states are required to provide certain basic services such as
hospital and physician care, some states also provide a wide range
of supplementary services such as drugs, dental, and clinic ser-
vices. -
399
IImpact of Medicaid on Access to Medical CareI
dures estab These optional features of the Medicaid program give rise to both substantial interstate variation in benefits. In 1970 payments per tion of thosi child recipient, for example, ranged from $43 in Mississippi to $240 may be rela in Wisconsin.8 Furthermore, most states in the Deep South cover For exampi only about one-tenth of poor children, whereas in the Northeast but with nearly all poor, and many near-poor, children receive services. substitute F Similar variations in benefits characterize the adult Medicaid ness of ph categories, influenced Medicaid benefits not only are unevenly distributed by state, but services by whites and urban residents receive a disproportionately large share ment (whic of them. Payments per white recipient are 75 per cent higher than A compl payments per black recipient.9 Rural residents get few benefits would inch from the program. For example, poor children in rural areas have age, sex, i
only11 per cent of their medical expenditures met by Medicaid, measures o compared with 75 per cent for poor children in central cities.'° include These sources of variation in benefits may interact and reinforce availability one another. For example, benefits in the South maybe low because to the poor of the high incidence of black or rural poor persons who receive little controlled or no benefits because of family composition or discriminatory ad- This mo
ministration of the program. Similarly, the low proportion of bene- was estima fits going to these groups may, in part, be a reflection of their 1969 HIS.' greater concentration in states choosing to maintain only limited characteris
Medicaid programs. variables u Furthermore, some of the variation in benefits may be attributable Rather thai to factors associated with location or race such as education, health education,
status, or availability of medical resources. To better understand the tion group independent influence of each of these factors, econometric tech- another niques are used below to estimate the utilization of hospital and reflect the
physician services by public assistance recipients. group. Cr(
more accu
FactorsDetermining Utilization of Geograp
MedicaidServices surveyis]
location of
Recipients of Medicaid benefits make no direct payment for ser- and short-I
vices, and physicians are required to accept state-established reim- included
bursement levels as payment in full for services. Therefore, there is SMSA's, no price mechanism by which quantity of services demanded is persons, fi
necessarily equated with quantity of services that providers are
willing to supply.
Actual utilization of services, therefore, is the outcome of a restricting
rationing process that may be affected by desires of physicians medically
regarding the patients they prefer to treat, willingness of patients to addition, t
provide the time and effort required to obtain services, and proce-
401 rn
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dures established by states administering the program that may
affect both the total quantity of services available and the distribu-
tion of those services among recipients. In addition, use of services
may be related to alternatives available to recipients and providers.
For example, poor persons in areas with charity hospital facilities,
but with few physicians willing to participate in the program, may
substitute hospital care for care from private physicians. Willing-
ness of physicians to participate, on the other hand, may be
influenced by numbers of physicians in the area, demand for their
services by non-poor patients, and level of Medicaid reimburse-
ment (which varies from state to state).
A complete model of utilization under Medicaid, therefore,
would include (1) patient characteristics, including health status,
age, sex, race, education, family size, and working status; (2).
measures of physician preferences among patients, which might
include many of the same patient characteristics as above; (3)
availability of medical resources both to the entire population and
to the poor covered by Medicaid; and (4) features of the program
controlled by the states.
This model of the utilization of medical services under Medicaid
was estimated with data on 3,163 public assistance recipients in the
1969 HIS.1' The survey provides much of the detail on individual
characteristics that is required for this analysis. The health status
variables used were chronic conditions and restricted activity days.
than single variables indicating age and head of household
education, dummy variables were used for several age and educa-
tion groups to capture nonlinearities in these effects. In addition,
another dummy variable was entered for females age 17 to 44 to
reflect the greater utilization of prenatal and maternal care by this
group. Cross-product terms of race and region were specified to
more accurately indicate where racial inequalities may occur.'2
Geographical identification of individuals interviewed in the
survey is limited. Using what information was provided on the
location of individuals, measures of the availability of physicians
and short-term general hospital beds per 1,000 population were
included as follows: for persons living in the twenty-two largest
SMSA's, figures for these particular areas were used; for other
persons, figures for the census region broken down by SMSA and
non-SMSA residence were inserted.'3
Variation attributable to state program features is reduced by
restricting the sample to public assistance recipients, excluding
medically needy persons covered by Medicaid in some states. In
addition, the analysis focuses on hospital and physician services,
401 Impact of Medicaid on Access to Medical CareI
two basic services required by law and for which states may be
expected tolessfrequently impose stringent restrictions on
benefits.
A possible source of bias that may continue to exist in the results
relates to the absence of Medicaid programs in eleven states at the
beginning of the year of the survey. Since seven of these states
were in the South, an attempt was made to alleviate this problem by
introducing a dummy variable for residence in the South. This
effort, however, proved to have no significant impact on the results
and is not included in the results reported.
For comparison purposes, similar estimates of utilization are
presented for low-income persons (family income below $5,000)
not receiving public assistance.'4 This is a heterogeneous group,
including some medically needy Medicaid recipients, some work-
ing poor with private health insurance, and some poor without
either public or private coverage. Although the incidence of Medi-
care and private insurance coverage in this group might be ex-
pected to have a substantial impact on the utilization of services by
this group, such information was not available in the survey. Part of
the role played by insurance coverage may, however, be reflected
in the variable that reflects working status.
For each dependent variable—physician visits in the
prior to the interview and hospital episodes and days for the
preceding year—a large number of values are concentrated at zero.
Since the classical least squares regression model is inappropriate






















Econometric Results for the Poor
Theresults of the Tobit estimation of physician and hospital
utilization for public assistance recipients and other low-income
persons are presented in Table 4. Chi-squares show that the
characteristics included in the estimates contribute significantly to
the explanation of the utilization of health services in all cases.
As shown in Table 4, both health status variables—restricted
activity days and chronic conditions—are highly significant in
explaining utilization by public assistance recipients and other
low-income persons. The impact of health status is illustrated more
clearly in Table 5, which gives the expected values for physician
visits, hospital episodes, and hospital days for varying hypothetical
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TABLE 4 Tobit Results—Public Assistance Recipients and































Restricted activity 0.135 0.137 2.63 0.198 0.130 1.99












































































Head of household—0.0910205 4.91 0.129 0.181 235
education, 9—12 (0.76) (1.51) (1.83) (2.45) (3.77) (325)
yrS.
Head of household0.565 0.001 —1.88 0.097—0.053 —0.93






































Black—outside —0.336—0.173 — 1.33 —0.050—0.086—137





















Chi-square 391 331 294 2274 1730 1734
NOTE:Istatisticsin parentheses.
aPersonswith family income under $5,000.
403 Impact of Medicaid on Access to Medical CarePhysician visits4.09 4.95 7.10 2.69 3.36 5.12
Hospital .141 .162 .210 .090 .108 .151
admissions












































Average health status is defined as at the mean level of restricted activity days and chronic con-
ditions for all low-income persons. Good health status is that at half the means. Poor health status is
that at twice the means.
constant at their mean values for the whole low-income population.
In every case public assistance recipients make more use of
services than other low-income persons. For example, a poor
person who is average with respect to health status would receive
52 per cent more physician visits and undergo nearly twice as many
days of hospital care as a similar poor person not on welfare
by reducing the price of care to zero, Medicaid has had a substantial
impact on utilization of those poor who are eligible for Medicaid
benefits.
Although poor persons with more severe health problems make
much wider use of medical services, public assistance recipients
are somewhat less sensitive to health status as a determinant of
utilization than other poor persons. This occurs largely because of
the high levels of utilization among Medicaid recipients in rela-
tively good health. For example, as health status deteriorates from
"good" to "poor," physician visits by public assistance recipients
increase by 74 per cent compared with 90 per cent for other
low-income persons.
Similarly, public assistance recipients show little sensitivity to
age as a determinant of either inpatient or outpatient care, after
adjustment for health status. Only among the elderly, who receive
significantly less ambulatory care than other public assistance
recipients, does age have a significant impact. On the other hand,
substantial differences occur by age for other poor persons. Chil-
dren receive more ambulatory care than adults age 45 to 64 and
hospitalization increases uniformly with age, even with adjustment
for health status.
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TABLE 5 Annual Predicted Utilization for Low-Income
Persons by Health Status and Welfare Eligibility,
Adjusted for Other Characteristics, 1969
Health Statusa
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45 to 64 and
with adjustment
The dummy for women of ages 17 to 44 proves a good proxy for
the special health care needs of females of child-bearing age for
both groups. In this area the contrast in the amount of care received
by Medicaid recipients and other poor women is especially sharp.
The expected number of physician visits by females from 17 to 44
yearsold, for instance, is 8.8 and 4.7 per year for members of each
group, respectively, when other variables are held constant at their
mean values. As shown earlier, although women in this age group
eligible for Medicaid have made substantial gains in the amount of
care received, these gains are not equally reflected in the propor-
tion of care received from specialists. Nonetheless, it can be
assessed that maternity care has been one area in which Medicaid
has been especially successful in meeting an important deficiency
in the health care of the poor.
Females in other age groups have not shared equally under
Medicaid. This suggests that the time constraints of women on
public assistance may be more binding because their services are
more needed in the home. The effect of the constraint of non-
monetary resources in welfare households is also evident in the
results for the family-size variable. Family size proves a signifi-
cantly stronger constraint on the use of health services for Medicaid
recipients than for other low-income persons. The interpretation of
the last two variables is supported by evidence earlier cited on the
higher traveling and waiting time spent by public assistance
recipients.
The effect of constraints on household resources is also evident
in the results for the variable indicating normal working status.
Individuals not on public assistance who are regularly employed
received significantly less care in hospitals than other poor persons.
Among public assistance recipients, the working-status variable has
no discernible effect largely because such a small proportion of the
welfare population is in the labor force.
Interpretation of the results for head of household education
must be tentative, although they do tend to show that persons in
households in which the head has more education recognize the
benefits of more health care, but also organize to receive care on a
more efficient basis. For public assistance recipients, differences
based on head of household education are apparent for those with
education between nine and twelve years for hospitalization and
those with better than a high school training for ambulatory care.
Although prices do not serve as an incentive for such persons to be
more efficient in obtaining care, as was also reflected in the
relatively strong influence of family size, nonmonetary constraints
405 Impact of Medicaid on Access to Medical Careplay a significant role in determining utilization in such house- TABLE6 4
holds.In other low-income households, education of the head F
seems to contribute to utilization if it is limited to some high school F
level training. That the level of utilization should not di'Ter be-
tween those in households where the head has more than and less Put
than a high school education may reflect distortion created by the Physi
households in which the head is highly educated but is deferring Vis
medical attention with the expectation that the household's income White 5 will improve. Black—
None of the availability variables substantially affect the utiliza- South 4
tion of health services, with the exception of ambulatory care Black—
received by non-welfare poor persons. In part, this may reflect the outside
inappropriate measure of these variables, since the poor may be South
restricted to a subset of all providers such as county hospitals or
those physicians practicing in low-income neighborhoods. There
are also two economic forces that may contribute to this result. markedly
First, since Medicaid patients do not pay for the care, providers, ences be
especially with regard to ambulatory care, lack the ability to affect than for
the utilization patterns of these persons by ordinary economic significai
means. Second, hospitals may be quite arbitrary in their hospitali- blacks an
zation of poor persons in seeking to fulfill their occupancy goals and recipient
charity obligations. Such behavior is plausible since low-income than am
persons receive a large amount of ambulatory care at hospital values f
outpatient departments, thus affording hospitals wide leverage over admitted
whether to admit these patients for inpatient treatment if there is a cipients
slack in occupancy levels, welfare
Separate estimates of utilization were obtained omitting the than for 1
availability measures and including dummy variables for nonmet- Althou
ropolitan residence in the South and outside the South. Ambulatory determiii
care was lower in the rural South, but rural poor outside the South
did not use ambulatory services significantly differently from urban size, woi
poor (see Appendix 3, Table 1). However, the rural South variable constant,
was not significant when the availability measures were also most ph
included (see Appendix 3, Table 2), perhaps because of the col- Discrimi
linearity inherent in the construction of the availability measures. criminat
The race variables reveal that the benefits of Medicaid have not munities
been shared equally by blacks and whites even after individual and . physicia
family characteristics have been taken into account. Black patients
Medicaid recipients in all areas receive less ambulatory care, and allocate
black hospitalization rates are also lower in the South.'6 As shown patients.
in Table 6, blacks do receive more care with Medicaid than they are requ
would without it; the improvement in ambulatory care is greatest in patients
the South and in hospital care outside the South. Medicaid also
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TABLE 6 Annual Predicted Utilization for Low-Income
Persons, by Welfare Eligibility, Region, and



















White 5.28 0.176 2.87 3.51 0.114 1.50
Black—
South 4.23 0.089 1.73 2.33 0.067 0.95
Black—
outside
South 3.88 0.151 2.70 3.36 0.105 1.37
markedly increases utilization by whites. Outside the South, differ-
ences between the races are in fact greater for Medicaid recipients
than for other low-income persons. Outside the South there is no
significant difference in the number of physician visits between
blacks and whites not on public assistance, whereas among welfare
recipients physician visits among whites are 24 per cent higher
than among blacks, holding other, variables constant at the mean
values for all low-income persons. White welfare recipients are
admitted to hospitals nearly twice as often as black welfare re-
cipients of similar characteristics in the South, while among non-
welfare recipients admissions for whites are 70 per cent greater
than for blacks.
Although itis not possible on the basis of this analysis to
determine definitely what accounts for the racial differences, some
explanations can be ruled out. For example, since education, family
size, working status, and availability of medical resources are held
constant, racial differences cannot be traced to these factors. The
most plausible explanation for the difference is discrimination.
Discrimination can be either overt or institutional.'7 Overt dis-
criminatory practices are apparently still prevalent in some com-
munities. For example, in one Alabama town, the four white
physicians all maintain segregated waiting rooms, keep black
patients waiting until all white patients have been seen, and then
allocate the remainder of the working day to the care of black
patients. Those patients for whom time does not permit treatment
are requested to return the following day. Waiting times for black
patients average between four and six hours.'8 Such discriminatory
practices obviously limit utilization by blacks.
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IImpact of Medicaid on Access to Medical CareFrequently, however, discrimination is institutionalized, arising
from segregated housing patterns, or past overt discriminatory
practices that affect current patterns of physician location, hospital program
staffing patterns, referral patterns, and patient preferences. Hearings of each o
financial on Civil Rights Act enforcement in Medicare and Medicaid re- to receiv cently held by the House Judiciary Committee indicate that institu- need. Ye tional discrimination is widespread. Among the causes cited are the lowe convenience of some institutions to black communities, farniliarit>' the poor, with some institutions from past associations, absence of a private Data physician causing patients to turn to charity hospitals, short supply
, potential of physicians in minority neighborhoods, and patients not informed
or aware that Medicaid benefits are available in private hospitals. vices per
incomes Some practices, such as ambulance drivers taking black accident About h victims to charity hospitals and expansion of hospital staffs re- services, stricted to specialists (whereas black physicians tend to be general for servi practitioners), may be either overt or "statistical" discrimination expensiv depending on whether the rules these decisions are Whites r devised for the purpose of excluding blacks from some facilities or than eld simply work out on average to exclude blacks.19 black pe In summary, substantial differences exist in the manner in which
health services are allocated among persons eligible for Medicaid represen
and other low-income persons. Health status, however, is the major ing reim
counties determinant of utilization for both groups, although public assist- for the ance recipients' use of services is somewhat less sensitive to health Regional status than that of other low-income persons. The poor not receiv- West we ing public assistance receive substantially fewer services than three-qu those on welfare, even after adjustment for health status is made. location Differences by age in utilization that are evident for the poor not on Part o welfare are not apparent for those receiving public assistance. associate There is evidence that nonmonetary effects have substituted for tion, monetary allocation of services among Medicaid recipients. As a




3.DISTRIBUTION OF MEDICARE BENEFITS deductil
that Unlike Medicaid, Medicare is a uniform, federal program providing per cent medical care benefits to all elderly persons covered by the social than Me security retirement program. Although the same set of benefits is The pri available to all covered persons regardless of income, race, or allocatin
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of benefits is
ome, race, or
geographical location, wide differences also exist in the Medicare
program in the use of services and receipt of payments on the basis
of each of these factors. It was originally hoped that the removal of
financial barriers to medical care would enable all elderly persons
to receive medical care services largely on the basis of medical
need. Yet, those elderly population groups in the poorest health are
the lowest utilizers of medical care services under the program—
the poor, blacks, rural residents, and residents of the South.
Data from the Medicare program indicate that in 1968 estimated
potential reimbursement for supplemental medical insurance ser-
vices per person enrolled was twice as high for elderly persons with
incomes above $15,000 as for persons with incomes below $5,000.
About half of this difference reflects differences in quantity of
services, whereas the other half represents a higher payment level
for services (which in turn may be accounted for by a more
expensive mix of services, better care, or pure price differences).
Whites receive 60 per cent more payments for physician services
than elderly blacks, and more than double the payments per elderly
black person enrolled in the South, with nearly all the difference
representing differences in percentage of eligible persons receiv-
ing reimbursable services.20 Elderly persons in nonmetropolitan
counties average $250 from Medicare annually compared with $360
for the elderly in metropolitan counties with a central city.2'
Regional differences are also substantial. Physician benefits in the
West were 40 per cent higher than in the South in 1968. About
three-quarters of the variation in these benefits on the basis of
location reflects differences in quantity of services received.22
Part of these large differences may be attributable to factors
associated with income, race, and location—factors such as educa-
tion, health status, and availability of medical resources. Again, to
investigate the role played by each of these several factors, an
econometric analysis of utilization of medical services by the
elderly was made using the 1969 HIS.
Unlike the Medicaid program, Medicare beneficiaries pay a
substantial portion Of the cost of physician services. The elderly are
required to pay the first $60 of physician expenses during the year
($50 in 1969), 20 per cent of all allowed charges in excess of the
deductible, and any excess of the actual charge for a service over
that determined by Medicare as reasonable. In 1972, on about 56
per cent of Medicare claims, physicians agreed to charge no more
than Medicare allows; on the rest, they were not so restrained,23
The price mechanism, therefore, may play a stronger role in
allocating services to Medicare beneficiaries.
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IImpact ofMedicaidon Access to Medical CareTwo groups of elderly, however, are not subject to the deductible
and coinsurance amounts: those elderly Medicaid recipients whose
states "buy" them Medicare coverage and those elderly purchasing
supplementary private health insurance. Unfortunately, the 1969
Health Interview Survey, although noting eligibility for public
assistance, does not indicate which elderly persons have private
insurance as well as Medicare. Since higher-income elderly per-
Sons are more likely to purchase supplementary private insurance,
including income in an examination of utilization of medical
services by the elderly will capture both the direct effect of income
and possible lower net prices faced by higher-income persons who
purchase insurance. The dummy variable for public assistance
recipients should capture the effect of zero price for those elderly
covered by Medicaid and Medicare.
Health status is measured, as in the Medicaid model, by re-
stricted activity days and chronic conditions, as well as a dummy
variable indicating some limitation of activity attributable to
chronic conditions. Several additional proxies for health status are
age, sex, and working status. The dummy variable for elderly
persons who consider working as their usual activity may also
reflect a greater time constraint for working persons. Since Medi-
care program data indicate that blacks in the South receive fewer
benefits than blacks in other areas, and still less than whites,
separate race dummies for the South and areas outside the South
were included in the analysis. Because of the limited education of
the elderly, education was captured by a dummy variable for all
persons with nine or more years of education rather than more
refined educational classes.
Availability of medical resources, measured by physicians per
1,000 persons and short-term general care hospital beds per 1,000
population, was also introduced into the model. The appropriate-
ness of including both supply and demand variables in a market in
which price plays a major role has been addressed in other studies.
With respect to physician services, Feldstein (1970) theorizes that
the physician sets both price and supply such that excess demand
exists for his services, whereas the consumer is simply a price-
taker.24 Fuchs and Kramer (1972) suggest alternatively that demand
is supply-induced. An increase in physicians per capita is likely to
reduce travel and time costs to the patients. In addition, they argue,
physicians may inflate demand when supply has some slack by
using their discretionary power to recommend to a patient his need
for more care.25 Again, with respect to hospital utilization, several
possible arguments are the existence of excess demand, the
















































































physician-agent relationship, and the incompleteness of that rela-
tionship because of peer group pressure on the physician.26
Data used in the analysis are also from the 1969 Health Interview
Survey of the National Center for Health Statistics. In 1969, the
survey included 11,970 persons age 65 and over. Observations were
excluded from this analysis for persons for whom either family
income or education was unknown or not reported, reducing the
sample size to 10,573. Like in the Medicaid estimates, Tobit re-
gression analysis is employed.
EconometricResults for the Elderly
Tobitregression results are given in Table 7 for physician visits,
hospital days, and hospital episodes. Chi-square tests indicate the
equations to be statistically significant.
All indicators of morbidity contribute positively to utilization and
are highly significant. Age, however, has a negative coefficient in
the physician visit equation and positive coefficients in the hospital
equations. Measures of morbidity apparently control for health
status sufficiently to permit the age variable to act predominantly as
a measure of the physical accessibility of services to the elderly.
Thus, the very old are less likely to seek ambulatory care but
compensate somewhat by utilizing more institutional care.
Computed annualized values of physician visits are shown in
Table 8 for different incomes and health status levels, holding other
independent variables constant at their mean values. The striking
observation is that health status does play the predominant role in
determining the number of physician visits a person will make.
Morbidity measures of twice the mean levels typically cause
slightly less than twice as many visits as average morbidity charac-
teristics. This relationship is stable for all income classes. Physician
visits vary more among income classes for persons in better health,
but no one in good health, for example, will ordinarily receive more
physician services than an elderly person whose health is only
average.
When adjustment is made for health status, physician visits
increase uniformly with income. As shown in Table 8, persons in
average health and with incomes above $15,000 made 70 per cent
more physician visits than low-income persons in similar health
and not receiving public assistance. The increase in utilization for
higher-income persons may occur either because the cost-sharing
provisions of Medicare are less of a deterrent to use as income rises































Restricted activity 0.120 0.115 2.02



















Public assistance 0.356 —0.056 — 1.10
recipient (2.60) (0.41) (0.45)








Individual education, 0.179 —0.021 —0.05














































































































TABLE 8 Average Physician Visits for the Elderly, by Health






No aid 2.78 5.64 10.47
Aid 3.86 7.52 13.42
$ 5,000—9,999 3.14 6.60 11.70
$10,000—14,999 3.75 7.27 12.98
$15,000 and over 5.35 9.53 16.98
SOURCE: Calculated from Table 7 and tabulations from the 1969 HIS.
'Good health is defined as no chronic conditions, limitation of activity, or restricted activity days.
Average and poor health are defined at the mean and twice the mean level of the three morbidity
indicators used.
or because higher-income persons aremorelikely to purchase
supplementary private insurance and hence face a lower net price.
The significance of the public assistance recipients variable
suggests that reduction in net price has a positive impact on use of
services. Persons on public assistance, and hence likely to have
cost-sharing amounts paid by state Medicaid plans, receive 30 to 40
per cent more services than other low-income persons not receiving
public assistance, holding constant for other determinants of utili-
zation such as health status, age, sex, race, and education.
Utilization of hospital services also increases with income; how-
ever, the difference in average hospital days between the highest-
and lowest-income groups is only 40 per cent as compared with a 70
per cent spread for outpatient visits (see Table 9). The lower
income elasticity for hospital care may reflect the greater medical
urgency of institutional care so that even lower-income persons
will, for the most part, pay the hospital deductible (of $44 in 1969).
Public assistance recipients do not differ significantly in hos-
pitalization from other elderly persons with incomes under $5,000,
which is plausible for two reasons. There are no extra benefits for
public assistance recipients under the hospital plan similar to the
elimination of deductible and coinsurance amounts under the
physician plan. In addition, the elderly on welfare are more likely
to substitute physician visits for hospitalization, and thus they have
less need to enter the hospital than poor persons not on welfare.
Racial differences in the South are substantial. Although their
average health status is worse than for the population as a whole,27
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TABLE 9 Average Hospital Utilization for the Elderly, by







Under $5,000 .114 .210 .362
$ 5,000—9,999 .140 .250 .427
$10,000—14,999 .159 .285 .472




$ 5,000—9,999 2.78 4.93 8.16
$10,000-14,999 2.85 5.02 8.29
$15,000 and over 3.52 6.06 9.77
'See Table 8 for definitions of health status levels.
elderly Southern blacks receive fewer ambulatory services than any
income group. Elderly blacks in average health in the South make
half as many physician visits (2.91 visits per person) as other
persons age 65 and over if their income is under $5,000, and they
receive no public assistance and make two-thirds as many visits
(6.67 visits per person) as others if they are in the highest-income
class. By contrast, differences in use of physicians by race are not
evident outside the South. Medicare has made no attempt to insist
that physicians not discriminate among patients on the basis of race,
arguing that Medicare merely reimburses patients for services
received and does not enter into contractual agreements with
physicians.
Racial differences in hospital care also exist in the South, al-
though Medicare has attempted to enforce nondiscriminatory prac-
tices in hospitals.28 Elderly blacks in the South in average health
spend 2.84 days in the hospital whereas other elderly persons
average 4.60 days. This suggests that discrimination in hospitals
may be as extensive as that shown by individual physicians in the
South, although physicians are not required to assert compliance
with provisions of the Civil Rights Act. In regions outside the
South, blacks are not hospitalized significantly less than whites.
The availability of more physicians causes elderly persons to visit










physicians more often for reasons cited earlier. Table 10 shows,
however, that the elasticity of supply is generally lower in those
areas where the number of physicians per capita is the lowest (for
average characteristics in those areas). An implication of this result
is that there is perhaps a surfeit of physicians in the Northeast and
urban parts of the West, since a large proportion of small changes in
physician manpower in those areas may be absorbed by those
covered by Medicare.
The elasticity of hospital episodes with respect to the availability
of hospital beds is 0.47, whereas the elasticity estimated from the
hospital day equation is 0.94. The hospital day elasticity does not
vary much by region, ranging from a low of 0.88 in the West to a
high of 1.01 in North Central states and is similar to the elasticity of
0.92 found by Feldstein for the whole population.29
The local supply of physicians contributes negatively to admis-
sions, indicating that physicians are inclined to hospitalize only
more severe cases among the elderly. Overall, the elasticity of
hospital days with respect to physicians is—0.20, confirming
Feldstein's suggestion that "better organization of physicians' ser-
vices for Medicare patients could generally reduce costly hospital
admission."3°
Separate estimates of utilization omitting the availability mea-
sures reveals that elderly persons in nonmetropolitan areas of the
South make significantly fewer physician visits than the urban
elderly, but rural elderly both in the South and outside the South
experience somewhat more hospital episodes than the urban el-
derly (see Appendix 3, Table 3). Including both the availability
measures and the geographical variables, however, eliminates the
significance of the geographical variables (see Appendix 3, Table
4).
TABLE10 Elasticities of Physician Utilization with Respect
to Physicians per Capita for the Elderly, by Region
and Residence for Characteristics in those Areas
All
RegionsNortheastNorth Central South West
All residences .80 1.00 .74 .61 .93
Urban .81 1.02 .77 .62 .94
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SOURCE: Calculated with data from Table 7, tabulations from the 1969 HIS, Haug, Robark, and
Martin, and Distribution of Physicians in the United States, 1970 (Chicago American
Medical Association, 1971). /
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Persons with more than eight years of education received sig-
nificantly more ambulatory physician services, as did females.
Education,, although important in explaining physician visits, does
not eliminate the significance of income as a major determinant of
physician utilization. Neither education nor sex were significant in
the hospital equations.
Elderly persons who still regularly work to earn an income are
hospitalized less often and for shorter periods. The net effect of the
financial constraint posed by losing time from being on the job is 38
per cent fewer hospital days than nonworking persons, holding
other factors at their expected values. Working did not have an
important effect on ambulatory care.
In summary, once adjustment is made for health status and other
determinants, use of medical services increases uniformly with
income. Elimination of cost-sharing requirements under the physi-
cian plan for Medicaid recipients, however, brings their utilization
up to that of the middle-income elderly. The results suggest that
discrimination against blacks in the South by physicians and
hospitals may be substantial—racial differences cannot be attrib-
uted solely to differences in income or education. Use of both
physician and hospital services by the elderly is sensitive to the
availability of medical services.
4.IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE
Ananalysis of experience with utilization of medical services under
Medicare and Medicaid yields three major implications in the
current consideration of national health insurance. First, financing
medical care can have, and has had, a major impact on helping
covered persons receive needed medical care services. The major
failure—at least of Medicaid—is not in what it tried to do, but in
what was not attempted—namely, widespread coverage of all poor
persons regardless of welfare status. As a consequence, those poor
persons excluded from Medicaid—estimated at 9 million persons in
1974—have failed to achieve adequate and equitable access to
medical services. Extension of medical care financing to these
persons, either through reform of Medicaid or national health
insurance, should be a top priority.
Second, experience with Medicare reveals that imposition of












































1net effect of the
the job is 38
rsons, holding















I to do, but in









amounts) results in wide disparities in use of medical services on
the basis of income. However, eliminating these payments for
Medicaid recipients enabled them to receive similar amounts of
services as middle-income elderly persons. This suggests that elimi-
nating or reducing cost-sharing provisions for all lower-income per-
sons while retaining some cost-sharing for higher-income persons
could help to achieve greater equality in access to care.
Third, both Medicare and Medicaid confirm that certain groups
of persons, even if covered by medical care financing plans, lag
behind in access to care. This is a serious problem for minorities,
who appear to continue to face substantial discrimination in the
medical care market. Rural residents and persons in the South also
face barriers to utilization of services, largely as a result of a limited
supply of medical manpower. Supplementary health care delivery
programs designed to meet the special needs of these population
groups must be an essential part of health care policy. Further
research to determine the most effective approaches to improving
the access to care of these groups is urgently needed.
APPENDIX 1
Definitions of Independent Variables
Chronic conditions:number of conditions (any departures from
state of physical or mental well-being) occurring more than three
months prior to interview or classified as chronic regardless of
onset.a
Limited in activity:1 if chronic conditions limit the amount or
kind of major or minor activity normally performed; 0 otherwise.
Age:age in years at last birthday.
Restricted activity days:number of days in two weeks prior to the
interview a person reduces amount or kind of normal activity
because of a specific illness or injury.
Income $5,000—.9,999:1 if family income is greater than or equal
to $5,000 and less than $9,999; 0 otherwise.
Income $1O,000—14,999:1 if family income is greater than or equal
to $10,000 and less than $14,999; 0 otherwise.
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Ift
Family size:number of related household members; coded 8 if
family has more than 8 members.
Public assistance:1 if person is recipient of public assistance
other than social security or pensions at time of interview and
family income is less than $5,000; 0 otherwise.
Black—South:1 if black living in the South; 0 otherwise.
Black—outside South:1if black living outside the South; 0
otherwise.
MDPC:nonfederal patient care physicians per 1,000 population
(see Section 1 for source and description of construction of this
variable).
BedPC:number of nonfederal short-term general and other spe-
cial hospital beds per 1,000 population (see Section 1 for source
and description of construction of this variable).
Education 9+ years:1 if education of individual is greater than 8
years; 0 otherwise.
Work:1 if major activity in twelve months prior to interview was
working to earn a living or working as paid for a family business
or farm; 0 otherwise.
Female:1 if female; 0 if male.
Source (unless otherwise noted above):U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, National Center for Health
Statistics,"Current Estimates from theHealth Interview
Survey—1969," Vital and Health Statistics Series 10, Number 63
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971).

























TABLE 1Ordinary Least Squares Estimates
Visits, by Age Group, 1 969a
of Physician
Physician 65 and
Visits All PersonsUnder 17 17—44 45—64 over
Constant 1.50 1.02 1.92 0.88 2.27
(16.52) (7.07) (11.91) (4.00) (8.13)
Income 1.01 0.93 0.32 1.22 0.73
$5,000—9,999 (9.64) (5.60) (1.76) (4.97) (1.82)
Income 1.28 1.26 0.48 1.21 1.46
$1O,000—14,999 (10.90) (6.97) (2.37) (4.43) (2.20)
Income 1.60 1.58 0.72 1.56 4.36
$15,000+ (11.78) (7.44) (3.08) (5.34) (5.94)1
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TABLE 1(concluded)
Physician
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Excluding individuals reporting family income unknown, those under 17 for whom head of household
education was unknown, and those 17 and older for whom individual education was unknown.
APPENDIX3
TABLE 1Tobit Results—Public Assistance Recipients














































































































Head of household—0.126 0.140 3.88 0.123 0.175 2.23
education, 9—12 (1.04) (1.02) (1.42) (2.33) (3.63) (3.06)
yrs.
Head of household0.522—0.081—3.26 0.088—0.063 —1.16








































Black—outside —0.315—0.129 0.22 —0.025—0.111 —1.44













Non SMSA— 0.094 0.552 9.34 —0.186—0.029
outside South (0.60) (3.18) (2.70) (3.06) (0.52) (1.78)
Chi-square 394 345 303 2268 1736 1728
yrs.
NOTE:tstatisticsin parentheses.
'Persons with family income under $5,000.
TABLE2 Tobit Results—Public Assistance Recipients and











Constant — 1.887 — 1.874—51.40 —3.302—3.010—50.10
(4.88) (2.67) (3.69)(18.77)(11.71) (13.00)
Restricted activity0.134 0.135 2.60 0.198 0.130 1.99














































































421 Impact of Medicaid on Access to Medical Care
Public Assistance RecipientsOther Low-Income Persons
PhysicianHospital Hospital PhysicianHospital Hospital
VisitsEpisodesDays VisitsEpisodesDays
Chronic conditions0.319 0203 332 0.342 0.252
(7.89) (4.39) (3.66)(1922) (1527)
Age17—44 —0359—0.160 1.67 —0.163 0.244
(131) (0.52) (0.28) (1.61) (2.59)
Age 45—64 —0.170 0.068 3.64 —0.181 0391
(0.86) (029) (0.80) (2.18) (5.08)
Age 65+ —0.404 0.182 6.81 —0.147 0.578
(2.04) (0.80) (1.50) (1.78) (7.56)
Female —0.073 —0.396—8.06 0.149—0.199
(0.06) (2.64) (2.70) (2.60) (3.74)
Female,age17—440.954 1.967 29.54 0.518 1238
(320) (5.88) (4.53) (4.88)(12.79)
Headof household —0.123 0.131 3.87 0.125 0.175
education,9—12 (1.01) (0.96) (1.42) (2.37) (3.62)
yrs.
Headof household0.530—0.096—328 0.093—0.066
education,>12 (1.81) (026) (1.12) (0.85)
—0.134—0.103—2.34 —0.078 0.007
(423) (2.83) (322) (5.03) (0.48)
0.060—0.103—0.53 —0.020—0324
(026) (0.39) (0.10) (0,32) (5.78)
—0.156—0.605—825 —0.439—0.522
(0.99) (3.03) (2.09) (5.32) (6.81)
—0.321 —0.096 0.18 —0.052—0.091
(2.19) (0.57) (0.05) (0.55) (1.01)
0.095—0.198—0.66 0226—0.273
(0.53) (0.91) (0.16) (2.52) (3.16)
— —0.067 0.32 — 0.042
(0.41) (0.10) (0.83)
NonSMSA—South —0.151—0.480—5.70 —0.062—0233
(0.65) (1.77) (1.06) (0.61) (2.43)
NonSMSA— 0.176 0.403 8.68 —0.015—0.244
outside South (0.79) (1.51) (1.63) (0.17) (2.82)
Chi-square 374 337 303 2274 1740 1746
NOTE:tstatisticsin parentheses.
'Persons with family income under $5,000.TABLE 3 Tobit Results—Persons Age 65 and Over, 1969 TABLE 4 T


























































Restricted activity 0.120 0.115 2.02

















Public assistance 0.383 —0.063 —1.14













Individual education, 0.178 —0.027 —0.29































Chi-square 898 800 799
NOTE:tstatisticsin parentheses.j
NOTE: Cstatisticsin parentheses.
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—62.43 Constant —2.072 —3.107 —63.22
(9.44) (4.81) (6.55) (7.48)
2.25 Chronic conditions 0.317 0.151 223
(5.78) (14.02) (6.90) (5.71)
12.00
(9.11)
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The authors purpose is to address three broad questions pertaining to the Section 3. a
Medicare and Medicaid programs in the United States: What impact have effortto cap
these programs had on use of medical services by the poor and the elderly? net prices
What factors account for differences in the level of use of Medicaid by those have suppli
who are eligible? To what extent do social and demographic characteristics find that, ot
affect the use of medical services by the elderly? The first three sections of the increaees
paper deal with each of these questions in turn, and a fourth section then covered by
discusses the implications of the empirical findings for a national health reqiJiremen
program. income eld
Section 1, which deals with the general impact of Medicare and Medicaid South, both
on use, draws from a variety of sources. The authors indicate that, since evidence o
enactment of these programs, use of medical services by low-income hospital se
individuals has increased, and that low-income persons have gained on those services, b
with higher incomes. However, as the authors stress in this section of the equitably b
paper, this general observation may be quite misleading. First, Medicaid In the fin
provides services only for certain categories of the poor, leaving approxi- their findin
mately 9 million poor uncovered. Second, there is evidence that the poor Medicaid h
receive lower-quality care and receive it in settings that are less convenient they indica
and less pleasant than is the case for the population at large. Third, the coverage fi
authors stress the fact that generalizations about levels of use by the poor and nationalh€..
the elderly may be misleading because of differences inhealth status sharing pro
between these groups and the population at large; they show that, although differences
the relationship between use levels and income levels tends to be U-shaped would incn
(with the poor and the wealthy receiving larger amounts of care than those in plan. Third
the middle-income groups), when health status is adjusted for, the relation- population
ship is positively sloped throughout. for minority
In sections 2 and 3, which deal individually with Medicaid and Medicare,
.
respectively, an econometric model is estimated. This is presented as an any
amore complete model, which is very briefly described, but
which is not considered feasible. The model that is estimated forthe Medicaid
study consists of three independent regression equations, of which the CRITI UE
independent variables are physician visits, hospital episodes, and hospital
days; twenty independent variables, including measures of health status, Inthis pa
measures of resource availability, and sociodemographic variables appear in substantial
each equation. The three equations are estimated first for public assistance programs.
recipients and then for other low-income persons, using Tobit analysis, and tance, but
the resulting coefficients are then discussed. Among other things, they show a
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that large variations in use occur among Medicaid eligibles, that blacks lag
substantially behind whites, that education increases the use of physician
services but not hospital services, that larger families have lower hospitaliza-
tion rates and ambulatory visits, and that health status is the major determi-
nant of utilization among the poor. However, use of services by public
assistance recipients is less sensitive to health status than is use by other
low-income individuals, and the poor who are not on public assistance
receive far fewer services than those on welfare, even after adjustment for
health status and other characteristics.
Similar equations are estimated for the analysis of Medicare benefits in
Section 3, although here the equations also include income variables, in an
effort to capture not only the direct effect of income but also the possibly lower
net prices that are faced by higher-income persons who are more likely to
have supplementary insurance. In brief, with respect to Medicare, the authors
find that, other things the same, the use of medical services by the elderly
increa€es uniformly with income, but, for those individuals who are also
covered by Medicaid as well as Medicare, the elimination of cost-sharing
requirements appears to raise their utilization rate to that of the middle-
income elderly. The authors find much lower levels of use by blacks in the
South, both for physicians and hospital services, which they interpret as
evidence of racial discrimination. They find that use of both physician and
hospital services by the elderly is sensitive to the availability of medical
services, but they also conclude that available hospital beds are rationed
equitably between the elderly and other age groups.
In the final section the authors then discuss three general implications of
their findings for national health insurance. First, although Medicare and
Medicaid have helped covered individuals receive needed medical care,
they indicate that Medicaid has failed by not covering allof the poor;
coverage for these individuals, therefore, is indicated as a top priority for a
national health insurance program. Second, they indicate that the cost-
sharing provision of Medicare leads to a wide disparity in use on the basis of
differences in income; therefore, a graduated cost-sharing arrangement
would increase the equitability of access under a national health insurance
plan. Third, experience with Medicare and Medicaid shows that some
population groups will lag in utilization even if they are covered, as is the case
for minority groups and residents of rural areas at the present time; therefore,
supplementary programs for such groups would seem to be required under
any national health insurance scheme.
CRITIQUE
Inthis paper Karen Davis and Roger Reynolds have presented a very
substantial amount of useful information on the Medicare and Medicaid
programs,informationthatisnot onlyof considerable policy impor-
tance, but also carries significant implications for future research. Since
a discussant findsitnecessary to focus on the weaknesses in,or the
427 Impact of Medicaid on Access to Medical CareT'
necessary qualifications to, the research under review, such negative corn- rnuch less
ments tend to occupy the major portion of the discussant's time; this, however, Simply a rer
should not be allowed to detract from the usefulness of much of the work necessary t
reported in this paper. Medicare and Medicaid represent the closest approx- used in dis
imations to national health insurance in the experience of the United States, occurred ac
and since analyses of these programs have been very few and far between, on the deg
this broad study is very welcome indeed. . variation ca
One distinguishing feature of the paper, as alluded to in the summary changes ov
above, is that it presents and discusses a considerable number of individual problem, us
findings, far more than can be covered in this brief discussion. As a result, this the authors'
review will be confined primarily to just a few of the broader, more general, of hospital
considerations even though this may fail to do full justice to the amount of from the cro
information the paper presents. expense of
My major concern really has to do with the interpretation of the statistical deficient,"
results. First, Ifeel that this paper treads dangerously close to what another groups." B
economist has called the "Regression Humbug Syndrome"; the equations that estimates,
are estimated here do have the appearance of the reduced forms of supply- may well
demand models, but we are given no explicit theoretical understructure for in supply in
these regressions, nor a discussion of expected signs. The independent However, th
variables that appear in the equations appear to have been determined less with those c
on the basis of theoretical reasoning than on the basis of what data were health irisu
available. In the absence of any explicit hypotheses to be tested, whatever have looke
significant relationships do drop out of the regressions are then discussed, just the opp
and are explained on a more or less ad hoc basis. One danger is the tendency dramatic ch
to conclude, implicitly, that if no significant relationship appeared, no such under 65,
relationship exists, which may be quite untrue. This general approach may be immediatel
more appropriate when the primary objective is prediction; here, however, was a subs
where our interest is less in prediction than in explanation and understanding cases, Whe
of structure, more explicit theoretical underpinnings would be desirable, question, b
One example of the difficulties which may appear in connection with this the elderly
kind of research approach is the interpretation of the finding of relatively low of what is s
levels of utilization, of both physicians and hospitals, on the part of blacks in the Davis-R
the South. The findings are very striking, and are of considerable interest and not: The fac
policy importance, but the interpretation of the cause of this disparity as clear, regions are
out-and-out racial discrimination is scientifically premature; at least, that the time when I
disparity in use is caused by discrimination cannot really be deduced from increase el
the present analysis, for we really don't know the degree to which the disparity therefore al
is attributable to demand as opposed to supply factors. Indeed, the authors' groups to i
interpretation does not seem like an entirely unreasonable one, but certainly caution is n
at least one plausible alternative is that, because of past discrimination, that occurn
blacks do not presently seek out care, so that the actual cause today is on the
Iwill lim
demand side rather than the supply side. This is not trivial, because the address or
appropriate policy for correcting such disparities would be very different in perhaps ret
each instance—requiring some kind of civil rights enforcement in the former, on health
and perhaps outreach and educational efforts in the latter case. availability
The second critical point I'll make also pertains to interpretation of results, have effecti
and I should hasten to add that although I feel that the point is important, it is a limitations
428
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of results,
is important, it is a
much less pervasive problem in this paper than is the former one. This is
simply a reminder that this study employs cross-sectional data, and that it is
necessary to be particularly cautious when the results of such an analysis are
used in discussions in which our real interest is in variations that actually
occurred across time; the appropriateness of cross-sectional data depends
on the degree to which those factors that determine the cross-sectional
variationcan reasonably be assumed to be the same factors that caused the
changes Iwill again give just one illustration of this particular
problem, using a case in which I do have empirical reason for believing that
the authors' interpretation of their findings is incorrect. This concerns the use
of hospital services by the elderly, under Medicare. The authors conclude
from the cross-sectional analysis that the elderly 'do not receive care at the
expense of younger persons needing medical care where supply is most
deficient," and that ". .. available beds are rationedequitably among all age
groups." Because of the weakness of the supply variables used for these
estimates, this conclusion should be somewhat tentative, but nevertheless, it
may well be that, cross-sectionally, use by the elderly responds to variations
in supply in essentially the same way as use by the population as a whole.
However, that is not really the question at issue; rather, we are concerned here
with those changes over time that are directly attributable to the provision of
health insurance for the elderly, which is not quite the same thing. In fact, I
have looked into this specific question using time series data and obtained
just the opposite resu It—that the introduction of Medicare coincided with very
dramatic changes in hospital use by the non-elderly. Specifically, for patients
under 65, diagnosis-specific lengths of stay were dramatically reduced
immediately after introduction of Medicare, and, for this younger group, there
was a substantial decline in admissions of the more discretionary types of
cases. Whether or not this shift was "appropriate" in some sense is a separate
question, but I believe there is no doubt that the increased use of hospitals by
the elderly did come at the expense of younger patients, which is the opposite
of what is suggested by the cross-sectional results. Thus,I would argue that
the Davis-Reynolds finding may itself be quite valid, but its interpretation is
not: The factors that determine the response of utilization to availability across
regions are not the same as the factors that determined these responses over
time when Medicare was introduced; and, the introduction of NHI, which will
increase effective demand by some groups more than by others, should
therefore also be expected to cause the increase in use by the more favored
groups to come at the expense of others. Again, my point is simply that
caution is necessary in generalizing these cross-sectional results to changes
that occurred over time.
Iwill limit my critical comments to these two points, butIwould like to
address one other issue that Ifeelis very relevant here, an issue that is
perhaps regarded by economists as the most pervasive and critical constraint
on health economics research. Thisis the matter of limitationsinthe
availability of statistical data. Ibelieve that the authors of this present paper
have effectively mined the data that were available to them, and many of the
limitations of their study are a simple function of the limitations in those data.
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However, I also think that in health economics we are at a point when we could
benefit by observing the research approaches of people in other fields, such
as sociology and psychology. Unlike economists, who have been prone to
design their research around the data in hand, in these areas the research is
often designed first, and then, perhaps as one step in that design process, the
survey instrument or the particular mechanism whereby the necessary data
will be generatedis developed. Although our usual approach—that of
massaging the secondary data we are able to acquire from others—has a
pleasing ring of efficiency, there is a question involving how often that
approach isreally cost effective. Therefore, perhaps economists should
become more willing to generate the data required to answer the questions
they want to raise. This does raise the monetary costs of doing research, but it
is pertinent to note that,at the Bureau of Health Services Research, the
problem we have faced has been more often a problem of finding research
proposals of high technical quality rather than finding the dollars to support
well-designed projects based on high-quality data. Ifeel this point is quite
relevant in this specific context; among the many contributions the authors
make in their paper is to narrow old questions and identify new ones, butI
really doubt if very much can be done about answering those questions
without some fairly heroic efforts on the part of researchers themselves to
generate the data that will be required.
Dorothy P. Rice
SocialSecurity Administration
As is usual with Dr. Karen Davis' work, this paper is a fine piece of empiricism.
The findings are significant in an important sense: two large government
programs—Medicare and Medicaid—are shown to have achieved what they
set out to do. This may be surprising to some economists because when one
searches the literature, one finds time and again that government programs
too often fail in their objectives. The paper is important because it compares
medical care use for the low-income population receiving welfare and other
poor persons, leading to the conclusion that extension of medical care
financing to those poor persons excluded from Medicaid should be a top
priority reform.
After a few specific comments, Iwill compare some of the Davis-Reynolds
findings with data from the Social Security Administration's Current Medicare
Survey for the population aged 65 and over.
With respect to Medicaid, the authors adjust the 1969 Health Interview
Survey for health status and show that physician visits increase with income if
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Current Medicare
physician use is compared with that of persons with middle and higher family
income. Although there is a verbal description of how the "adjusted for health
status" physician visits were estimated for Table 2, it is stIll not clear what the
equations in Appendix 2 mean. Therefore, the reader has to trust that the
authors did the estimations correctly.
In explaining the factors determining the use of Medicaid services, the
authors state "... there is no price mechanism by which quantity of services
demanded is necessarily equated with quantity of services which providers are
willing to supply." Although quantity demanded may not be a function of
price, since the Medicaid recipient does not pay for services, the fact that fee
schedules vary from state to state means that the quantity supplied may vary
from state to state as a function of the fee schedule. The authors appear to
recognize that physicians may prefer to treat some patients rather than others
but do not explicitly include fees paid as a measure of physician preferences
among patients. A variable for this might be included in the regression
analysis in Table 4.
With respect to the Medicare program, the authors fail to point out that
utilization trends observed for 1967—1969 do not hold for 1969—1971. Pettingill
(quoted on page 392) also shows that Medicare admissions per 1,000
population rose at an average annual percentage change of 0.3 from 1969 to
1971 compared with 7.4 between 1967 and 1969. Covered days of care per
1,000 population increased 12.6 per cent per year from 1967 to 1969 but
declined 3.4 per cent per year between 1969 and 1971. Average length of
covered stay increased 4.8 per cent per year during the earlier period and
declined 3.8 per cent per year in the later period. ECF admissions per 1,000
enrollees hit a peak in 1969, increasing by 15.7 per cent over 1968 but
declined 10.2 per cent during 1969—1970 and 13.4 per cent during 1970—
1971.1 There was an initial impact of Medicare coverage during the first three
years that has reversed direction or tapered off in subsequent years. The
implications of these more recent changes are not discussed by the authors.
In the section on "Distribution of Medicare Benefits," Davis arid Reynolds
discuss data from the Medicare program but could do a great deal to make
the actual meaning of their statements clear to the reader. For example, they
state that"... whites receive 60 per cent more payments for physician
services than elderly blacks." It is true that reimbursement for physician and
other medical services per person enrolled under SMI in 1968 was 62 per cent
higher for whites than for all other races, but there was only a 15 per cent
difference in terms of reimbursement per person served.2 The authors claim
"nearly all of the difference" in reimbursement per person enrolled between
whites and all other races represents "differences in percentage of eligible
persons receiving reimbursable services." The authors should indicate how
they determine this point. In 1968, reimbursement per person enrolled was
$78.76 among whites and $48.44 among all other races. By definition,
Health Interview
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ing for tam
=number served low or high
number enrolled services pe
those with
then the difference in reimbursement per person enrolled between whites and To the exte
all other races can be expressed as would also
A(PQ) = ÷ + pay more
higher.
where, for example, represents the difference in reimbursement per It may b
person enrolled between whites and all other races, p0 represents reim- lished dat
bursement per person served among all other races, andrepresents the Medicare I
ratio of number served to number enrolled among all other races. With this Davis ai
equation, and assuming that the interaction term is distributed proportionately restricted
between the P and 0 terms, we can determine the proportion of the difference recipients
in reimbursement per person enrolled between the races that is attributable to sensitive
differences in reimbursement per person served and percentage of enrolled observed
persons receiving reimbursable services. Taking the necessary data from the table
1968 summary, we do not find that nearly all the difference stems from the covered s
proportion of enrollees served. Twenty-seven per cent is attributable to a welfare re
difference in reimbursement per person served of $199 among whites and gradients
$173 among all other races. because o
Additional questionable statements are made by the authors with respect to health. Thi
the factors affecting geographical and income differencesin Medicare and the av
reimbursements. Reimbursement depends on meeting the deductible and as health
determining reasonable charges. Charges for some services may be disal- services a
owed more often than for other services and utilization of services may vary Davis-H
by geographic area, income class, etc. The extent to which charges are health stat
disallowed for a particular covered service may also vary by characteristics direct
such as geographic area and income class, seP/ices,
Davis and Reynolds argue that economic forces may contribute to lack of Reynolds
significant coefficients among the availability variables in their regression significant
equations for public assistance recipients and other low-income persons. variable ci
More specifically, 'since Medicaid patients do not pay for the care, providers, persons,i
especially with regard to ambulatory care, lack the ability to affect the what relati
utilization patterns of these persons by ordinary economic means." What do CMS table
the authors mean by "ordinary economic means?" We suspect they do not region, wit
assume a typical competitive economic market with equilibrium prices and Northeast
quantities responding to shifts in supply and demand. As the authors indicate, the West i
there is no one theory of market behavior that is generally accepted as the propoi
describing the market for physicians' services. The market for hospital more in th
services is also complex, and interpretation of the coefficients of the availabil- One tin
ity variables requires a detailed examination of the markets for these services, relation bi
In their concluding remarks, the authors state that "imposition of uniform although r
cost-sharing provisions (deductible and coinsurance amounts) results in wide may capti
disparities in use of medical services on the basis of income." They find Davis a
utilization among the elderly related to income, but it does not follow that programs"
432 Davis and Reynolds 433 Ii
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cost-sharing provisions cause these disparities. Furthermore, after account-
ing for family size in determining whether a given annual family income was
low or high, Peel and Scharff (1973) found no difference in the number of SMI
services per user with charges between enrollees with high family incomes and
those with low to moderate family incomes and no public medical assistance.3
To the extent that medical care prices vary geographically, equality in access
would also require coinsurance rates to vary with prices if an enrollee is not to
pay more coinsurance for the same quantity of services where prices are
higher.
It may be interesting to compare the Davis-Reynolds findings with unpub-
lished data from SSA's Current Medicare Survey (CMS) of a sample of
Medicare beneficiaries interviewed monthly for a period of fifteen months.
Davis and Reynolds find health status in terms of chronic conditions and
restricted activity days positively related to utilization, with public assistance
recipients using more services than other low-income persons and being less
sensitive to health status in their utilization (tables 4, 5). Similar results are
observed for Supplementary Medical Insurance enrollees in the accompany-
ing table based on data from our Current Medicare Survey. Utilization of
covered services increases as comparative, health status deteriorates, with
welfare recipients using many more services at each level of health. The
gradients are quite steep for both groups, but less so for welfare recipients
because of high utilization by welfare recipients with comparatively better
health. These conclusions apply both to the percentage of enrollees served
and the average number of services peç person served. Utilization increases
as health status deteriorates both because relatively more persons receive
services and each recipient uses more.
Davis-Reynolds and CMS findings (not shown here) are consistent for
health status and public assistance, and partly for race. Both surveys show
direct relationships between utilization of physicians' care and covered
services, respectively, and health status and public assistance. Davis and
Reynolds report that blacks in the South make fewer physician visits, but no
significant relation for blacks outside the South. But their black-outside South
variable compares utilization by blacks outside the South with that of all other
persons, including blacks in the South. It is difficult, therefore, to know just
what relation exists between utilization by blacks compared with whites. The
CMS table shows more covered services per person served for whites in each
region, with the differences between whites and all other races greater in the
Northeast and West than in the South. (Number of enrollees of all other races in
the West is too small, however, to provide a reliable estimate.) Furthermore,
the proportion of whites served exceeds the proportion of all other races by
more in the Northeast and North Central than in the South.
One final point is worth mentioning. Davis and Reynolds find a negative
relation between physician visits and age, whereas CMS shows a positive,
although not highly significant, association. As they point out, however, age
may capture the effect of health status if the latter is not controlled.
Davis and Reynolds conclude that "supplementary health care delivery
programs" designed to meet the special needs of minorities, rural residents,
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aand persons in the South must be an essential part of health care policy. This
statement surely serves to whet the appetite. What are these supplementary
programs? Are they medical service, manpower, or health insurance pro-
grams? Would they supplement or replace existing programs? How would they
be financed?
Medicare and Medicaid have clearly accomplished a great deal toward
increasing access to medical care. Nevertheless, substantial gaps exist for
certain population groups. The solution to meet the special needs of these
population groups clearly is not readily apparent.
NOTES
1.Eugene Carter and Charles Fisher,Health Insurance br the Aged: Hospital and Extended Care
Admissions by State, Fiscal Year 1971,'Social Security Administration, Health Insurance
Statistics, Hl-42, March 12, 1973.
2.U.S. Social Security Administration, Office of Research and Statistics, "Medicare: Health
Insurance for the Aged, 1968, Section I: Summary," Washington, D.C., 1973, PP. 1—18, 19.
3.Evelyn Peel and Jack Scharif, 'Impact of Cost-Sharing on Use of Ambulatory Services under
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